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Abstract 
Volatility of petroleum pump prices in Kenya has continually affected its economic growth. Almost all other 
sectors of the economy growth rely on the petroleum products and therefore its instability in price leads to poor 
planning of other sectors. Expected profits by the companies who planned when the prices were favourable 
becomes affected leading to losses.  Those who do not incur losses results to increasing the prices of goods and 
services making the costs of living increase and therefore lowering the social economic growth. This paper is an 
extract from the completed research on drivers of instability in prices of petroleum products in Kenya (Munyua & 
Ragui, 2013). The main objective is to find out how the regulatory component affects the volatility of petroleum 
oil prices in Kenya.  
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1. Introduction: 
The prices of regulated petroleum products in Kenya have been a cause of major public outcry for a long time. 
This has led to search of different strategies to stabilise owing to the importance of petroleum products for growth 
of the country (Munyua & Ragui, 2013). Just prior to introduction of price regulation, various stakeholders had 
expressed strong views that the then retail prices of petroleum products in Kenya were too high and unjustified 
(Mwirichia, 2011). The period after December 2010 when pump price regulation was re-introduced is important 
for this study as a key objective of regulation was price stabilization.  
According to Pirog (2005), oil is an international commodity whose ownership and ultimate destination 
is determined by market forces once it leaves the producing country and no country can effectively isolate itself 
from changes elsewhere in the market, nor is it likely that any nation can take actions that do not indirectly affect 
other nations. This observation is important when considering the effect of price regulation on local prices of 
petroleum products. Fattouh (2011) noted that little attention has been devoted to the process of price discovery in 
the oil markets and the factors affecting oil price stabilization remain under-researched. Further, UNCTAD (2005) 
observed that developing country Governments face heavy exposure to oil price volatility, either on the export or 
the import side – and sometimes, both.  
Nduru (2009) sought to justify need for price controls and argued that the post deregulation retail prices 
of petroleum products in Kenya did not follow the changes in international oil prices. The Kenyan parliament, in 
December 2010, re-introduced a price capping formula through the Energy (petroleum Pricing) Regulations, 2010 
whose main objective was to stabilize prices of petroleum products. Prices of petroleum products in Kenya have 
been volatile and reached a high of Kshs 121.13 in May 2012 for a litre of gasoline compared to the price of Kshs 
94.03 before regulation in Dec 2010 (an increase of 28.8% in eighteen months). Over the same period, the price 
of automotive diesel (gasoil) rose from Kshs 87.45 in December 2010 to Kshs 108.44 in May 2012, an increase of 
24% in eighteen months, despite a reduction of taxes on gasoil to cushion consumers and tame inflation (Mwirichia, 
2011). This compares well with the observation by Watkins (2006) that since 1986, the Price Index for oil products 
has been more volatile than for other commodities. 
 
2. Theoretical Review 
This study is anchored on two theories that have been used to explain the effect of regulation on volatility oil prices.  
 
2.1 Informal Approach Theory 
The informal approach analyses oil price behavior within a specific economic and political context. Slaibi, Duane 
and Daouk (2006) found that though previous work on crude oil price modelling had generally focused on two 
theoretical approaches, either the peak oil theory of optimal control analysis of pricing of a declining resource, or 
OPEC as a partial monopolist setting oil prices to maximize net present value, and neither had been wholly 
satisfactory.  Boll (2005) supports this by stating that the price of oil bears no relation to the scarcity of oil in the 
ground or to the cost of getting it out of the ground. Further discussions advanced by Boll (2005), Slaibi et al 
(2006), Chermak and Patrick (2002), Krautkaemer (1998), Barnett and Morse (1963) and Smith (1979) critically 
look at the over-reliance to Hotelling theory and Peak Oil theory. 
According to Juvenal and Petrella, (2012), dramatic developments have taken place in the oil market over 
the last ten years such that oil prices cannot be said to be just driven by supply and demand as in the past. Tang 
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and Xiong (2011) go further and point out that a speculative component may be behind the recent boom in oil 
prices. Fattouh (2007) however recognized that although the informal approach is essential to understanding 
current and past developments in the oil market, it could only provide a cursory view about how the oil market 
and oil prices might develop in the future. The informal approach theory is relevant to this study in that factors 
that determine volatility of prices of oil products in Kenya are likely to be diverse and go beyond elasticities and 
reserves.  
 
2.2 Price-cap Regulation Theory 
According to Hertog (2010) there are two broad traditions with respect to the economic theories of regulation. The 
first tradition assumes that regulators have sufficient information and enforcement powers to effectively promote 
the public interest. This tradition also assumes that regulators are benevolent and aim to pursue the public interest. 
Economic theories that proceed from these assumptions are therefore often called ‘public interest theories of 
regulation’. Another tradition in the economic studies of regulation proceeds from different assumptions. 
Regulators do not have sufficient information with respect to cost, demand, quality and other dimensions of firm 
behavior. They can therefore only imperfectly, if at all, promote the public interest when controlling firms or 
societal activities. 
Price-cap regulation is an innovation in regulatory policy that was developed in the 1980s and has been 
applied around the world. According to Cowan (2002), the general problem is that a firm with partial or complete 
market power must be regulated to prevent it from abusing its dominant position through excessive pricing.  
The key feature of a price cap is that the price level is not responsive to anything. Price-cap regulation 
(PCR) in practice is, of course, not as straightforward as simple theory would suggest. In particular price caps do 
not last indefinitely and are thus usually temporary measures to curb excesses for a period. The Energy Regulatory 
Commission uses price cap regulation in its attempt to regulate and control prices of petroleum products in Kenya. 
This theory therefore advised the study in relation to regulation as an independent variable. However, critics of 
regulation such as Joskow and Noll, (1981) are of the view that economic research has demonstrated convincingly 
that price and entry regulation based on the research on transportation, and oil and natural-gas production creates 
economic inefficiencies. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
A conceptual framework is a construct in which each concept plays an integral role. Smith (2004) defines a 
conceptual framework as framework that is structured from a set of broad ideas and theories that help a researcher 
to properly identify the problem they are looking at frame their questions and find suitable literature. The 
conceptual framework for this study is shown as figure 1. 
 
4. Empirical Review 
In a study that looked at the relationship between petroleum taxes and world prices in Cambodia Bacon and Kojima 
(2008), found that taxes make up a sizable fraction of retail fuel. Taxes on petroleum products are a critical source 
of government revenue for Cambodia because taxing fuel is one of the easiest ways to get revenue: collecting fuel 
taxes is relatively straight forward and there is generally a robust relationship between consumption of fuels as a 
group and income consumption tends to go up at the same rate as income.  Though this study gives some insights 
as to tax as one of the factors contributing to volatility of prices of petroleum products, it does not comprehensively 
show us how that relationship comes about. Taylor and Doren (2005), for example, concluded that despite moral 
issues involved, government efforts to take excess profits from oil companies either through price controls or taxes 
have proven to be futile exercises which fail to reduce prices but only manage to reduce supply, increase imports 
and impose steep costs on the economy as a whole. However, unlike in Cambodia, petroleum tax regime in Kenya 
is mostly based on a specific tax amount per litre, therefore is not ad valorem. It is recommended that a study be 
carried out on the relationship between taxes and volatility of petroleum products putting into considerations the 
contributions of theory and having an elaborate method of data collection.  
According to Taylor and Doren (2005), proponents of intervention contend that gasoline markets are not 
competitive (with some accusing producers of price collusion), that fat profit margins induce little more supply 
than might otherwise be induced by healthy but “reasonable” profit margins, and that the gasoline profits are 
largely unanticipated and unearned. Taylor and Doren (2005) concluded that due to intervention or government 
regulation, oil companies reap very large profits at the expense of consumers. This conclusion needs to be further 
researched on in Kenya given that in 2012, two of the four major oil marketers reported huge losses despite a 
regulated pricing mechanism for petroleum products in Kenya.  
A study on taxation and pricing of petroleum products in developing countries by Hossain, (2003) used 
the modern theory of public economics as the point of departure. The paper outlined a basic principle for setting 
taxes and/or prices of commodities based on two criteria, efficiency and equity. The paper showed that for 
petroleum products, the basic principles needs modification in the presence of various externalities and market 
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imperfections in a setting where the instruments to address externalities and imperfections are limited.  
In a study on international oil price regime origins rationale and assessment, Mabro (2005) observed that 
petroleum prices do not always move at the same rate – be it up or down – as crude oil prices. The prices paid by 
consumers for a petroleum product may differ significantly from the ex-refinery price because of excise and value-
added taxes which, in many countries, amount to a hefty imposition. For example, in Kenya, the study found that 
Premium and Regular Gasoline and Gasoil are heavily taxed products in Kenya.  The Kenya Revenue Authority 
introduced a tax rule that oil marketing companies (OMCs) pay duty for products up front effective August 1, 
2005. This simply meant that OMCs would be required to pay taxes at the point of product entry: upon receipt of 
products from vessels or refinery in Mombasa. This had a major effect on the financing of oil purchases as the 
cash outflow required now included taxes payable upfront on products at the point of entry.  
Universal price subsidies and petroleum product tax reduction are the two most commonly used methods 
of partially off-setting higher oil prices on the international market (Kojima, 2009). A price stabilization fund, on 
the other hand, attempts to set domestic prices higher than international prices in times of low world oil prices and 
save the balance in the fund; when world oil prices exceed a threshold level, money is withdrawn from the fund to 
subsidize domestic prices (Kojima, 2009). A price stabilization fund may have an intuitive appeal but does not 
work well in practice, and all such funds were strained in 2007–08 (Bacon &Kojima, 2008). If there is a national 
oil company or an oil company with some state involvement that is also a price-setter (because it controls a large 
share of the market), the government may send signals to the company to keep prices low (Kojima, 2009). Prior 
to re-introduction of price regulation, Kenya had tried to use the National Oil Company of Kenya (NOCK) to 
stabilize prices of oil products, without much success. The methodology applied by the ERC was to have a price 
capping formula with an aim to eliminate high prices being set by oil marketers driven by profit maximization 
goals. 
Few governments are able to withstand the pressure to use or increase fiscal measures to lower prices 
(Kojima, 2009). As a result, some countries that moved to automatic price adjustment mechanisms years ago 
suspended price adjustment and bore financial losses. In West Africa, for example, four of five countries studied 
engaged in price smoothing during the run-up to international prices from 2007 through mid-2008 (Bacon & 
Kojima, 2008); only Senegal maintained a consistent automatic adjustment process. The other four countries, 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Niger, suspended automatic price adjustment based on a clearly defined 
import parity structure. 
Critics of price regulation like Rockoff (2008) hold the view that price controls do not accomplish what 
they were intended to do and are generally to be avoided. Martin (2002), on his part, states that the primary 
criticism levelled against price controls is that by keeping prices artificially low, demand is increased to the point 
where supply cannot keep up, leading to shortages in the price-controlled product.  
Taylor and Doren (2005) examined these different arguments with particular attention to retail gasoline 
markets and found the arguments supporting price control to be generally unpersuasive. They concluded that both 
economic theory and past experience suggest that aggressive price controls and windfall profits taxes will harm 
consumers by creating fuel shortages and reducing investment in new supply. This view is supported by Martin, 
(2002) who pointed out that once controls were removed, prices would immediately increase, which could 
temporarily shock the economic system.  
From this literature review, it is clear that opinion is divided on what causes volatility of oil prices whether 
under regulated or deregulated oil pricing mechanisms. For premium, regular and gasoil fuel grades, regulatory 
components (taxes, oil profit margins and allowed losses) form a major fixed component of the price as they 
account for about 50% of the total price. However, the indirect impact of the requirement that petroleum taxes be 
paid at the point of product entry, and its financing implications further complicate the impact of taxes as a 
regulatory factor on pump prices of petroleum products and needs to be studied.  
Notably Mabro (2005) focused on oil price regimes, origins and assessment and, though the study gives 
the reader useful insights as to the effects of taxes on price volatility, it does not comprehensively look into the 
issue. The study lacks clarity in terms of the source of data on the relationship between Kenyan tax system and 
taxes on petroleum product and volatility of the prices of the same products. This is a major concern and studies 
should be carried out to cover this gap. In addition, the study relies entirely on literature review. This may not give 
the current status of petroleum products prices volatility and the factors that affect the prices. It is important to 
make sure that the methodology used in a study like this fulfills the requirements of scientific research and provides 
a clear picture to the reader of the issues under study. 
The study carried out thorough review of literature on prices of petroleum products from 2004-2008 
provides useful insights for the current study on oil marketing companies and dealer profit margins as a factor 
influencing the volatility of oil prices in Uganda. However, a closer look at literature review reveals that though 
this could be true, the study does not provide empirical data to support this argument. The reader then can only 
speculate that it is very likely that the lack of fair competition has allowed all oil companies to collude to set high 
prices in order to keep their profit margins as high as possible.  
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In a study leaning against oil price controls , Taylor and Doren (2005) observed that proponents of 
regulated pricing of oil products contend that gasoline markets are not competitive; that fat profit margins induce 
little more supply than might otherwise be induced by healthy but “reasonable” profit margins, and that gasoline 
profits are largely unanticipated and unearned. This contradicts studies by proponents of oil controls such as 
Twimukye and Matovu (2009) who are of the view that oil marketing companies are reaping very large profits at 
the expense of consumers. Similar opinions by oil consumers and interest groups in the Kenya Oil Market led to 
re-introduction of regulated prices of oil markets in 2010 after persistent increases in prices of oil products were 
experienced between 2008 and 2010.  
In a study on Indian’s petroleum sector refined product pricing and refinery investment, Kieran and 
Dagmar (2010) provided a holistic examination of pricing and investment dynamics in India’s downstream 
petroleum sector. The study focused on the ability of key downstream companies to meet rapidly growing Indian 
product demand, and the prospective emergence of India as major global refined product exporter, an outcome 
with considerable potential implications for the evolution of global and regional product markets. The study ended 
with an examination of product market pricing and observes that petroleum pricing policy is entirely unsustainable 
in its current form.  
The study observed that in order to lessen the burden of dealing with petroleum prices, the Government 
of India, besides reduction of taxes, was looking into the issue of oil spillage as a factor affecting the volatility of 
oil prices in the region. This was being looked at in terms of the capacity of the country to have the right storage 
and distribution facilities to avoid oil losses. According to Kieran and Dagmar (2010) the major issue affecting the 
pricing of petroleum products is that of taxes. However, the authors observed that the government was exploring 
the issue of oil spillage as a factor affecting petroleum prices, but admitted that data on the same was minimal. 
This implied that there was a possibility that oil losses through spillages and operational factors lead to volatility 
in oil prices though the subject had not been explored.  
 
5. Research Methodology  
5.1 Research Design 
Causal research design was used to measure what impact a specific change had on existing norms and assumptions. 
Most social scientists seek causal explanations that reflect tests of hypotheses. Causal effect occurs when variation 
in one phenomenon, an independent variable, leads to or results, on average, in variation in another phenomenon, 
the dependent variable (Bachman, 2007).Causal research is an investigative act which helps to identify the 
relationship between two variables and determines which variable might be causing certain behavior in the variable 
being explained. 
 
5.2 Research Population 
The population of this study comprised of the 65 licensed oil marketing companies as listed on Appendix IV, 600 
independent oil dealers, one petroleum lobby group (PIEA), one regulator (ERC), Kenya Pipeline Company, 
Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited, National Oil Company of Kenya and Ministry of Energy and Petroleum all 
of whom play different roles in the Petroleum industry of the Energy sector in Kenya.  The population of this study 
comprised of the 65 licensed oil marketing companies as listed on Appendix IV, 600 independent oil dealers, one 
petroleum lobby group (PIEA), one regulator (ERC), Kenya Pipeline Company, Kenya Petroleum Refineries 
Limited, National Oil Company of Kenya and Ministry of Energy and Petroleum all of whom play different roles 
in the Petroleum industry of the Energy sector in Kenya. The population was as shown on table 1. 
 
5.3 Sampling Technique 
The sampling technique to be followed in this study was stratified random sampling. Stratified random sampling 
is a sampling technique that involves the division of a population into smaller groups known as strata. In stratified 
random sampling, the strata are formed based on members' shared attributes or characteristics. A random sample 
from each stratum was taken in a number proportional to the stratum's size when compared to the population. 
These subsets of the strata are then pooled to form a random sample.  From the population on table 1, a total of 96 
respondents were sampled as shown on table 2. 
 
5.4 Data Collection Tool 
A self-administered questionnaire and face-to-face standardized interview schedules were the two principal tools 
of primary data collection. The choice to use questionnaires was based on the fact that they can be sent to a large 
number of people and thus save the researcher time and money. Secondary data was obtained mostly from the 
relevant internet sites including ERC website for monthly published price press releases and world oil price data, 
tax rates from KRA websites, exchange rates and interest rates from CBK web sites.  
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5.5 Pilot Testing 
Creswell (2003) states that the size of a sample to be used for pilot testing varies depending on the time, cost and 
practicability, but would tend to be between 5-10 per cent of that of the main survey. The exercise targeted at least 
one respondent from each stratum by discretion and sampled up to 10 respondents. These respondents did not 
participate in the final research and therefore the findings of the study were free of redundancy. 
 
5.6 Data Analysis 
The model used in this study was comparable to the one used by King, Deng and Metz (2012). Using an 
econometric model, the study regressed the monthly percentage change in the ERC pump prices on a set of 
variables, identified from the literature, that typically explain movements in the retail prices of petroleum products.  
The model takes the form at time t: 
Yt = β0 +β4(REG) t +µ 
Where, Yt denoted the average percentage change in price of a particular oil product in a given month t, REG is a 
vector of Regulatory Costs. In addition, determinants of volatility in oil prices that were not specifically covered 
were considered under the random error term (µ).   
At time t-1, the model takes the form: 
Yt-1 = β0+ β4(REG) t-1+ µ 
This model form is important as Granger causality test was developed for analysis of the effect of one 
time series on another one, thus each test is between two time series (Bahadori & Liu, 2012). In this study, the test 
was between cause and effect of price changes between any two periods, thus any two months. This model was 
extended to different time frames divided into months as prices are revised on a monthly basis in Kenya and started 
with the most recent month as t and going back by referring to the immediate past month as t-1, t-2 and so on. The 
impact of the various drivers were then tested by comparing the price fluctuations between each two subsequent 
time periods and the components or drivers that led to such volatility in prices analyzed to establish their effect. 
The econometric analysis examined separately the individual role played by each factor determining 
volatility of oil prices in the period December 2010 to June 2015 following a pattern similar to that applied by 
King et al (2012) except that the latter examined daily price change factors, while this study examined drivers of 
monthly price changes in Kenya. The monthly approach was advised by the fact that the price regulator (ERC) 
determines prices valid for a month unlike in the world stage where daily price changes are applied. December 
2010 was selected as the start period because it coincides with the time when price cap regulations were introduced 
in Kenya by ERC. The study period was considered adequate to help arrive at conclusions that can be applied over 
longer periods as it comprised of 55 months of regulated pricing and hence trends can be developed.   
The study followed Granger causality analysis to model the relationship between the explanatory 
variables and a response variable by fitting a non-linear equation to observed data. Every value of the independent 
variable (REG) was associated with a value of the dependent variable Y. The regression line described how the 
mean response changes with the explanatory variable. The observed value for Y varied about their means and was 
assumed to have the same standard deviation. The fitted values (REG) estimated the parameters of the population 
regression line. Since the observed values for Y may vary about their means, the multiple regression model 
included an error term µ for this variation. The error term µ in a regression model captures the effect of factors 
that have not been included in the model. 
This study employed Granger causality tests to analyze the lead and lag relations among oil prices in a 
multivariate system. Granger causality analysis (GCA) is a method for investigating whether one time series can 
correctly forecast another (Granger, 1969).The Granger causality requires a prior knowledge about the maximum 
lag and is suitable for time series studies (Bahadori & Liu, 2012).  
Tests for stationarity were also performed in line with the approach taken by King et al (2012). According 
to Challis and Kitney (1991) Stationarity, is defined as a quality of a process in which the statistical parameters 
(mean and standard deviation) of the process do not change with time. The most important property of a stationary 
process is that the auto-correlation function (ACF) depends on lag alone and does not change with the time at 
which the function was calculated. 
Correlations between the independent variables were also tested in the same way as in a recent study 
(Chen, Hamilton, Thomason, Gotlib, Saad & Cox, 2009) that use signed path coefficients to perform t-test at group 
level statistics.  King et al (2012) also employed Granger causality tests to analyze the lead and lag relations among 
oil prices in a multivariate system and estimate a vector error correction model (VECM). The VECM approach is 
preferred because it allows the researcher to perform a long-run analysis. However, Büyükşahin and Harris (2011) 
combine it with the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach. The final step was to run Granger causality 
tests using stationary variables and draw inferences. 
 
6. Research Findings 
The number of questionnaires, administered to all the respondents, was 150. A total of 115 questionnaires were 
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properly filled and returned by respondents. This represented an overall response success rate of 77%. Babbie 
(2004) also asserted that return rates of 50% are acceptable to analyze and publish, 60% is good and 70% is very 
good. 
 
6.1 Reliability Tests 
Using Cronbach’s Coefficient Alpha test on regulatory costs, a coefficient of 0.784 was found as shown on table 
3. These results corroborate findings by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) and Christensen, Johnson and 
Turner (2011) who stated that scales of 0.7 and above, indicate satisfactory reliability. Based on these 
recommendations, the statements under the regulatory costs variable of this study were concluded to have adequate 
internal consistency, therefore, reliable for the analysis and generalization on the population. 
 
6.2 Sampling Adequacy 
To examine whether the data collected was adequate and appropriate for inferential statistical tests such as the 
factor analysis, regression analysis and other statistical tests, two main tests were performed namely; Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Barlett’s Test of Sphericity. For a data set to be regarded 
as adequate and appropriate for statistical analysis, the value of KMO should be greater than 0.5 (Field, 2000).  
Findings in table 4 showed that the KMO statistic was 0.743 which was significantly high; that is greater 
than the critical level of significance of the test of 0.05 (Field, 2000). In addition to the KMO test, the Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity was also highly significant (Chi-square = 128.636 with 6 degree of freedom, at p < 0.05). The 
results of the KMO and Bartlett’s Test are summarized in table 4. These results provide an excellent justification 
for further statistical analysis to be conducted.  
 
6.3 Unit Root Tests 
Unit root testing using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) approach was conducted in order to establish whether 
the data set was stationary. The key objective in testing for stationarity was to ensure that the variables revert back 
to their mean even when there are shocks. The variables were first tested for stationarity at levels using the data 
set as collected. The variables were found to be non-stationary as their p-values were greater than the critical p-
value of 0.05. These results are displayed in table 5. 
Because the tests to be run on the data require the variables to be stationary, the variables were first 
differenced and a unit root test was then run on the differenced series, consistent with the guide given by Hyndman 
and Athanasopoulos (2013). The results of these unit root tests after the first difference are indicated in table 6. 
The p-values reported indicate the variables are stationary after first differencing and indicating that the series was 
integrated of order one.  
The results show that, in all cases, the p-value is below the critical value at 5% level of significance; thus, 
the study rejected the null hypotheses that the differenced variables had unit roots and accepted the alternate 
hypothesis that the variables are stationary. This result meant that after the first difference the variables could now 
be subjected to granger causality and regression analysis as stationarity had now been established to exist.  The 
null-hypothesis for an ADF test is that the data are non-stationary. So large p-values are indicative of non-
stationarity, and small p-values suggest stationarity.    
 
6.4 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
The Granger causality testing is a widely used methodology for inferring the causation between variables in 
regression analysis (Zhang &Liu, 2014). The study used pairwise granger causality tests to test the null hypotheses 
that the dependent variable does not Granger-cause an independent variable and vice versa for each of the variables. 
The study applied the decision rule, as given by Zhang and Liu (2014), that where the value of the F-statistic is 
low and the probability value (p-value) is high, researchers should reject the null hypothesis and where the F-
statistic is high and the probability value is low, researchers should accept the null hypothesis to interpret these 
results. The results of these tests are displayed in table 7, where changes in regulatory components Granger-cause 
changes in pump prices but changes in pump prices do not Granger-cause changes in regulatory costs. This 
unidirectional cause and effect result is expected as indeed regulation is meant to tame pump prices and not vice 
versa.   
 
6.5 Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis was conducted after successful testing of validity and reliability using KMO coefficient and 
cronbach alpha results. Factor analysis was conducted using Principal Components Method (PCM). The extraction 
of the factors followed the Kaiser Criterion where an eigen value of one or more indicates a unique factor. Total 
variance analysis indicates that the four statements on regulatory costs can be factored into one factor. The total 
variance explained by the extracted factor is 61.19% as shown in table 8. 
Table 9 shows the factor loadings for regulatory costs. All the statements attracted coefficients of more 
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than 0.4 hence all the statements were retained for analysis. According to Rahn (2010) a factor loading equal to or 
greater than 0.4 is considered adequate.  
 
6.6 Descriptive Analysis 
The objective of the study was to establish the effect of price regulation on the prices of petroleum products in 
Kenya. Results on table 10 show that 46.1% of the respondents disagreed that taxes on petroleum products affect 
volatility in pump prices, 59.4% disagreed that profit margins on oil products cause volatility in pump prices, 39.1% 
disagreed that oil losses affect volatility of pump prices and 60.9% agreed that government protection affects 
volatility of pump prices. The mean score for this section was 2.93 which indicates that majority of the respondents 
disagreed that regulatory costs affect the volatility of oil prices. 
 
6.7 Relationship between Regulatory costs and Oil Pump Prices 
Table 11 shows the correlation results which indicate that there was a positive and significant relationship between 
regulatory costs and oil prices. This was evidenced by the p-value of 0.000 which is less than that of critical value 
(0.05). 
 
6.8 Overall Model Estimation 
The overall model significance was presented in table 12. An F-statistic of 47.772 indicated that the overall model 
taking account of all explanatory variables was significant. The findings imply that the explanatory variables were 
statistically significant in explaining volatility of oil pump prices in Kenya. The results imply that regulatory costs 
were statistically significant in explaining volatility of pump prices in Kenya.  
 
7. Summary of Findings 
The objective of the study was to establish the effect of regulatory component on the prices of petroleum products 
in Kenya. Results of both primary and secondary data analysis indicated that regulatory costs were key drivers of 
oil prices volatility.  This was evidenced by granger causality test results and the responses from the respondents 
who disagreed that taxes on petroleum products affect volatility in prices of petroleum product prices in Kenya, 
profit margins on oil products cause volatility in prices of petroleum products in Kenya, oil losses affect volatility 
of oil prices in Kenya and protection of government controlled oil companies affects volatility of oil prices in 
Kenya. Regression and correlation results indicated that there was a no significant relationship between regulatory 
costs and volatility of oil petroleum products. This was, however, attributed to the visible volatility of regulatory 
costs over the study period and this study observes that a study in a period of more volatility in regulatory costs 
could indeed arrive at different results.   The findings imply that regulatory costs were not statistically significant 
in explaining volatility of oil pump prices in Kenya for the period of this study. 
 
8. Conclusions 
The study concluded that regulatory costs were mostly stable and did not cause volatility in pump prices. The study 
further concluded that the pump pricing of petroleum products in Kenya is volatile and complex, and regulated by 
more than one government body. Few of the Oil Marketing companies operating in Kenya are well developed with 
the exception of the four international conglomerates that dominate the sector. The study observed that the oil 
sector supply chain is very important in ensuring volatility of pump prices of petroleum products.  
The study findings indicate that the world witnessed a high volatility of oil prices over the study period 
(2010 to 2015). Another finding is that Petroleum Taxes comprise a huge component of the oil price of between 
30 and 50% depending on international oil pricing and so the government should streamline its taxation regulation 
to ensure that taxes do not lead to very high prices. The indirect impact of the requirement that petroleum taxes be 
paid at the point of product entry, and its financing implications further complicates the impact of taxes on prices 
of petroleum products as this factor was not part of this study.  
The study also concludes that since taxes in Kenya are a fixed component of up to Kshs 35 per litre, price 
trends in Kenya cannot directly follow trends in the world. This means that even if the world prices fell to zero, 
there would be a fixed tax element in Kenya.  
 
9.  Recommendations 
The study recommends that in order to lessen the burden of dealing with petroleum prices, the government should 
consider reduction of regulatory costs (petroleum taxes and profit margins) and also look into the issue of oil losses. 
This should be looked at in terms of the capacity of the country to have adequate storage and distribution facilities 
to avoid oil losses and to be able to stock enough products in periods when world oil prices are low that are then 
released to the market in periods when oil prices are high thus creating a stabilization effect.  
The government should streamline its taxation regulation to ensure that excise and value-added taxes do 
not amount to hefty imposition on oil companies who pass the same onto consumers. The indirect impact of the 
Journal of Energy Technologies and Policy                                                                                                                                      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3232 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0573 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.6, 2016 
 
16 
requirement that petroleum taxes be paid at the point of product entry, as its financing implications mainly 
complicates the impact of taxes on prices of petroleum products. 
With the current fuel price regulation, oil marketing companies’ and dealers’ margins are guaranteed. 
However, the government in collaboration with oil marketing companies needs to check whether ERC’s pricing 
formula caters for all applicable costs. This will determine whether lack of price volatility in Kenya is due to an 
ineffective pricing formula as the study found that changes in pump prices in Kenya are not fully aligned to 
international price trends.  
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Independent variables  Dependent Variable 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
 
Table 1: Population 
Category Target respondents 
Target Population 
% of Total 
Population 
OMCs Supply & Sales Managers 65 9.490 
Oil Dealers Dealers & Managers 600 87.590 
ERC Regulatory Officials 1 0.146 
NOCK Supply & Sales Managers 1 0.146 
MOEP Office of the Permanent Secretary 
Head of Oil Sector 
6 0.876 
KPC Supply & Distribution Managers 6 0.876 
KPRL Supply & Distribution Manager 5 0.730 
PIEA Managing Director 1 0.146 
Total  685 100.000 
 
Source: Ministry of Energy (2013) 
 
  
 
 
Volatility of Pump Prices  
 
    Petroleum Price Index 
Price Regulation 
1. Oil Taxes changes 
2. Profit Margins fluctuations 
3. Allowed Loss fluctuations 
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Table 2: Sample Size 
Category Target Sample 
OMCs 
 
 
General Managers 
Supply/Distribution  Managers 
Finance Managers 
10 
10 
10 
Oil Dealerships Oil Dealers 60 
ERC Regulatory Officers 1 
NOCK Supply/Distribution  Managers 1 
MOEP Ministry Officials 1 
KPC Supply /Distribution Manager 1 
KPRL Supply/Distribution Manager 1 
PIEA General Manager 1 
Total  96 
 
Table 3: Reliability Test for Regulatory costs 
Variable Regulatory costs 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.784 
N of Items 4 
 
Table 4: Regulatory costs KMO Sampling Adequacy &Bartlett's Sphericity Tests 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure  0.743 
Bartlett's Chi- Square 128.636 
Bartlett's df 6 
Bartlett's Sig. 0.000 
 
Table 5:  Unit Root Test for Variables at levels 
Null Hypothesis T-Statistic   Prob.* 
Price Regulation Factors have a unit Root -1.55  0.50 
 
Table 6:  Unit Root Test Results for Variables after First Differencing 
Null Hypothesis Observations t-Statistic   p-value Result 
First difference regulatory components have a unit root 52 -7.739  0.000 Stationary 
 
Table 7: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Decision 
Regulatory costs do not Granger-cause pump prices  4.793 0.01 Reject Ho 
Pump prices do not Granger-cause Regulatory costs  1.061 0.35 Accept Ho 
 
Table 8: Regulatory costs Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues   Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.448 61.19 61.19 2.448 61.19 61.19 
2 0.703 17.568 78.758    
3 0.503 12.571 91.33    
4 0.347 8.67 100    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 
Table 9: Factor Loading for Regulatory costs 
Statement 
Factor 
Loading 
Taxes on petroleum products cause volatility and/or affect volatility of prices of petroleum 
product prices in Kenya 
0.785 
Profit margins on oil products cause volatility and/or affect volatility of petroleum products 
prices in Kenya 
0.855 
Oil losses  cause volatility and/or affect volatility of oil prices  in Kenya 0.757 
Protection of government controlled oil companies cause volatility and/or affect volatility of 
oil prices in Kenya 
0.726 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 10: Regulatory costs Descriptive Analysis 
Statement 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disag
ree 
Neutral Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
Liker
t 
Mean 
Taxes on petroleum products cause volatility and/or affect volatility of oil pump 
prices  
13.9% 32.2% 8.7% 26.1% 19.1% 3.04 
Profit margins on oil products cause volatility and/or affect volatility of oil pump 
prices  
22.5% 36.9% 16.2% 19.8% 4.5% 2.47 
Oil losses  cause volatility and/or affect volatility of oil pump prices   10.4% 28.7% 25.2% 24.3% 11.3% 2.97 
Protection of government controlled oil companies causes volatility and/or affects 
volatility of oil pump prices 
18.2% 8.2% 12.7% 52.7% 8.2% 3.25 
Average 16.3% 26.5% 15.7% 30.7% 10.8% 2.93 
 
Table 11: Relationship between Regulatory costs and Oil Prices 
Variable   Average Prices Regulatory costs 
Average Prices Pearson Correlation 1  
 Sig. (2-tailed)  
Regulatory costs Pearson Correlation 0.501 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000  
 
Table 12: Overall Model Estimation 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 55.363 3.631  15.249 .000 
Regulatory Costs -.618 1.253 -.051 -.494 .623 
      
F Sig. R R Square   
47.772 .000b .829a .687   
a. Predictors: (Constant), Regulatory Costs 
 
